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Yuanxiang John Li1 and Elizabeth Hoffman2 
Abstract 
One of the most challenging problems modern firms face is that their weakest link in maintaining 
information security is the behavior of employees: clicking on phishing emails, telling friends 
and family private information, and searching for private information about themselves (Loch, 
Carr and Warkentin 1992). A survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute reported that 
the average monetary loss per incident was $288,618 and that 44% of those who responded to 
the survey reported insider security-related abuse, making it the second-most frequently 
occurring computer security incident (Richardson 2008).   
This paper uses a questionnaire from Hu, West and Smarandescu (2015) to test for the efficacy 
of different reward and punishment schemes in preventing insider security-related abuse. Hu et 
al.’s (2015) scenarios elicit from participants whether they would recommend violating company 
IT policies. Real monetary payments provide motivation.3 The results indicate that, if a company 
can detect abuses with some degree of certainty, the best strategy among those tested is to 
regularly reward individual employees with small rewards for complying with company policy 
and punish every detected violation. This recommendation contrasts with the existing literature, 
which focuses almost entirely on punishment for detected security breaches. This focus on 
punishment is referred to as General Deterrence Theory (Straub Jr 1990). The results in this 
paper suggest strongly that General Deterrence Theory does not provide an effective strategy for 
preventing security breaches. 
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3 There is considerable experimental economics literature showing that monetary incentives are more effective than 
surveys to generate reliable responses. (See, for example, Binger et al., 1995; Hoffman and Spitzer, 1993; and 
Shogren et al., 1994). 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most challenging problems modern firms face is that their weakest link in maintaining 
information security is the behavior of employees: clicking on phishing emails, telling friends 
and family private information, and searching for private information about themselves (Loch, 
Carr and Warkentin 1992). A survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute reported that 
the average monetary loss per incident was $288,618 and that 44% of those who responded to 
the survey reported insider security-related abuse, making it the second-most frequently 
occurring computer security incident (Richardson 2008).   
 
Given the integral role of IT in today’s enterprises, information security must be a key 
component in modern enterprise planning and management (Chang and Ho 2006).  Information 
security refers to the extent to which corporate information is free from disclosure, modification, 
or destruction due to intentional or unauthorized access (Finne 2000).  In order to protect against 
security breaches, organizations often rely on technology-based solutions (Ernst and Young 
2008, PwC 2008).   
 
However, technology cannot guarantee information security without a good management policy 
that is properly implemented.  Moreover, information security is not exclusively a technical 
problem but also a behavioral issue (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000, Dutta and McCrohan 2002, 
So and Sculli 2002, Vermeulen and Von Solms 2002, Von Solms and Von Solms 2004).  
Success in information security can be achieved when organizations invest both in technical 
solutions and in incentives to improve employees’ compliance with information security policies 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat 2010). 
 
It has long been recognized that companies’ information security efforts are threatened by 
employee negligence and insider breaches (Loch, Carr and Warkentin 1992). Employees are 
often the weakest link in maintaining information security (Mitnick and Simon 2002, Warkentin 
and Willison 2009).  There is a large body of MIS literature, based on General Deterrence 
Theory (Straub Jr 1990) discussing how to “punish” employees if they do not comply with the 
information security policy in a firm.  On the other hand, some recommendations take a 
“gentler” approach, such as using rewards or incentives, to reduce their employees’ 
noncompliance (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat 2010, Padayachee 2012, Pahnila, Siponen 
and Mahmood 2007, Vance and Siponen 2012). However, few papers incorporate both means to 
reduce information security breaches (Chen, Ramamurthy and Wen 2012, Liang, Xue and Wu 
2013).  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no extant MIS literature has used experiments with human 
subjects and monetary incentives to examine employees’ compliance behaviors (See Smith 1976, 
for a discussion of the use of monetary incentives in experiments using human subjects). A 
Sommestad et al. (2014) review paper examined 29 studies with more than 60 possible variables 
hypothesized to improve information security policy compliance and deter noncompliance. No 
dominant variables were clearly identified.  Most of these studies measure improvement or 
deterrence through a self-reported survey or a hypothetical single-scenario-based experiment 
without real incentives paid to participants; hence, there is reason to believe that using many 
different scenarios and real economic incentives will further the understanding of how reward 
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and punishment influence employees’ behavior with regard to complying with a firm’s 
information security policy.   
 
From an organization’s perspective, rewards and punishments are two very practical ways for a 
company to motivate its workforce to reduce security breaches.  A meta-analysis done by Balliet, 
Mulder and Van Lange (2011) revealed that both rewards and punishments had a medium to 
large effect on IT policy compliance.  In the IT world, a security violation is different from a 
regular policy violation in the non-IT world. A single data breach caused by even one employee 
can lead to negative effects on the whole organization.   
  
This paper also considers the impact of collective rewards and punishments. Although modern 
western companies do not employ collective rewards or collective punishments, they were 
commonly used in U.S. military boot camps in the 1980s (Gilham 1982).  Heckathorn (1988) 
showed that when leaders use collective rewards and punishments to encourage compliance 
group members monitor and regulate one another’s behavior.  
 
This study may also be the first to analyze the impact of collective rewards and collective 
punishments on information security compliance.  This paper aims to assist organizations in 
designing a realistic and effective managerial policy and payment structure to prevent data 
breaches.  Specifically, this paper considers the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: How do monetary rewards affect employees’ compliance with an information 
security policy? 
RQ2: How do monetary punishments affect employees’ compliance with an information 
security policy? 
RQ3: What are the combined effects of monetary rewards and punishments on 
employees’ compliance with an information security policy?  
RQ4: Does the implementation of collective rewards or punishments affect employees’ 
compliance with an information security policy? 
RQ5: How do changes in the probability of being detected by a monitoring system affect 
employees’ compliance with an information security policy when there is a fairly low 
probability of being detected as not complying? 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews previous work on compliance in 
the information security literature.  Section 3 develops the core hypotheses.  Section 4 outlines 
the research methodology.  Section 5 presents the data collection and analyses.  Sections 6 and 7 
present and discuss the results.  Section 8 presents the conclusions and elaborates on their 
implications and limitations, suggesting further research.  The appendices present some of the 
econometric analyses, the scenarios, and the instructions. 
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2  Review of the Literature 
2.1. Human Factors in Information Security 
The insider threat is always present and manifests itself in many ways in human society (Colwill 
2009).  The Target security breach in 2013 (Abrams 2014, Rockefeller 2014, Wallace 2014) 
illustrates the severe consequence of employees’ noncompliant behavior.  According to the 
report from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Rockefeller 2014), 
Target’s payment network system was intruded via its third-party vendor, Fazio Mechanical 
Services, a provider of refrigeration and HVAC systems.  Some employees’ virtual private 
network credentials were stolen through a phishing attack of malware delivered in an email at 
Fazio.  Hackers then used the stolen credential information from Fazio to remotely log into 
Target’s network payment system, stealing the payment and personal information of as many as 
110 million customers, and then copied this sensitive information from Target’s network to a 
server in Eastern Europe.   
 
This particular breach affected more than a third of the U.S. population, exposing 34% of 
Americans’ financial information (Wallace 2014).  This massive data breach directly led to a 
more than $148 million dollar loss to Target’s shareholders (Abrams 2014).  Furthermore, in 
order to maintain loyal customers, Target has been providing free credit monitoring for its 
customers, further undermining Target’s profitability.  Moreover, Target faces lawsuits from its 
customers, imposing additional costs on the company.   
 
Even in governmental organizations, insiders are prone to information security failures (Colwill 
2009).  The UK Government’s Revenue and Customers Department lost the personal 
information of 25 million people in a single incident (Thomson 2007).  Research shows that 
insiders, not outsiders, are responsible for 70% of data breaches; however, organizations focus 
90% of security controls and monitoring on external threats (McCue 2008).  
 
The Datalossdb Open Security Foundation website shows that about 24% of the total data-loss 
incidents in 2012 were due to employees violating organizational IT policies.  In addition, the 
ongoing PwC survey in the UK in 2015 shows that 75% of information security breaches in large 
organizations were the result of human factors.  This figure is an increase from 58% one year 
earlier (PwC 2015).  Similarly, the Chronology of Data Breaches shows that in 2012 in the U.S., 
approximately 9,232,015 records were stolen as the result of insider data breaches.  The 
Ponemon Institute shows that 35% of data breaches around the world were due to human errors 
(Alaskar, Vodanovich and Shen 2015).   
 
Although external hackers are sophisticated, with advanced technology skills, much research 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat 2010, Herath and Rao 2009, Hu et al. 2012, Hu et al. 2011, 
Myyry et al. 2009, Warkentin and Willison 2009) has shown that the human agent is still the 
weakest link in the defense against threats to organizational information assets.  Nevertheless, no 
information security practice or technique is effective if not properly followed by employees 
(Ernst and Young 2002, Puhakainen 2006).   
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However, the responsibility for following organizational security policies is typically delegated 
to employees (Herath and Rao 2009).  Employees may leak the organization’s information assets 
for their own benefits or simply ignore the security policy (Puhakainen 2006).  As a result, there 
is a conflict between employees’ interests and those of the organization.  
 
In order to motivate employees to comply with an organization’s information security policy, the 
organization tries to “induce” employees to behave as it intends to by aligning both entities’ 
interests.  For example, if the organization could reliably monitor employee behavior, it could 
pay a regular bonus on top of each employee’s base salary to those employees who regularly 
comply with the organization’s information security policy.  Essentially, the paid bonus could 
reconcile the conflict between employees’ noncompliance with the organization’s security 
requirement and the organization’s need for compliance. Paying bonuses to employees who 
regularly comply could be combined with fining employees who are detected as not complying 
with the organization’s information security policies. Such a combined policy of rewards and 
punishments might further enhance employees’ compliance. 
 
Despite the possible advantage of combining rewards and punishments, neither managerial 
academic literature nor industry practice emphasizes this incentive structure in information 
security compliance.  Organizations rely on the perceived force of regulation (e.g., sanctions) 
and believe it is each employee’s duty to obey the rules.   
 
2.2. Employees Compliance with an Organization’s Information Security Policies 
 
An information security policy violation can be very serious for an organization, as the 
consequence of one non-compliant action can compromise an organization’s entire information 
security system.  As illustrated by the Target breach, one employee’s noncompliance can be very 
costly for the organization. The ideal situation for an organization is that all its employees should 
comply with the organization’s information security policy.  However, one non-compliant 
employee may be difficult to detect.  This paper studies detection and incentives in reducing 
employee non-compliance with information security policies. 
 
Biological and social science research has shown that incentives are powerful means to align 
individual and group interests (Edney and Harper 1978, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Hashim and 
Bockstedt 2015, Henrich 2006, Lynn and Oldenquist 1986, Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 1992, 
Rand et al. 2009, Sigmund 2007, Yamagishi 1986).  As the organization wants its employees to 
comply with its information security policy, providing positive incentives for compliance and 
negative sanctions for non-compliance will encourage each individual employee to conform to 
the organization’s information security policy. 
 
To summarize, the information security of an organization is not merely dependent on its 
hardware-software sophistication, nor on some employees’ good behavior, but also on all 
employees’ compliance with the organization’s information security policies.  The ability to 
detect data breaches may be as important as the incentives employed to increase compliance. 
One of the questions this paper asks is: can an organization significantly improve compliance 
with a combination of rewards and punishments? Moreover, does it matter if detection is certain 
or uncertain? 
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3 Theoretical Arguments and Core Hypotheses 
 
3.1. General Deterrence Theory 
According to the review paper by Alaskar, Vodanovich and Shen (2015),  General Deterrence 
Theory is still the dominant theory used by Information Systems scholars to study information 
security compliance (Chen, Ramamurthy and Wen 2012, Cheng et al. 2013, D'Arcy, Hovav and 
Galletta 2009, D’Arcy and Hovav 2009, Guo and Yuan 2012, Harrington 1996, Herath and Rao 
2009, Herath and Rao 2009, Lee, Lee and Yoo 2004, Siponen and Vance 2010, Son 2011, Straub 
Jr 1990).  Straub Jr and Nance (1990) adopted classical deterrence theory from criminology 
literature into their information security studies.  Deterrence theory posits that individuals weigh 
costs and benefits when deciding whether or not to engage in criminal behavior (Siponen and 
Vance 2010).  This is similar to the economic argument by Becker (1968) and Becker (1974) on 
the economic theory of criminal behavior. 
 
In the information security setting, Straub Jr (1990) argues that violation behavior can be 
reduced by imposing sanctions that are certain and severe to potential rule-breakers.  However, 
another review paper by Sommestad et al. (2014) concludes that general deterrence theory has 
questionable efficacy. The perceived severity of sanctions and the perceived certainty of 
sanctions have limited power over employees’ noncompliance behavior.  Hence, deterrence 
alone will not significantly reduce information breaches. 
 
3.2. Detection and Incentives 
As noted above, current MIS literature tends to focus mostly on punishments and occasionally on 
rewards, but not on both at the same time. The MIS literature does not address problems 
associated with an inability to reliably detect employee behavior.  Moreover, the current 
literature focuses heavily on surveying participants for their compliance intentions, rather than 
on providing actual monetary incentives for compliant behavior or monetary disincentives for 
noncompliant behavior.  This study starts with the assumption that a company can reliably detect 
both compliance and noncompliance. It tests for the importance of this assumption later. Use of 
monetary incentives and the assumption of reliability of detection lead to the following 
hypotheses. 
 
H1:  Monetary Rewards for compliance will have a positive impact on employees’ 
compliance with a company’s information security policy.  
 
H2: Monetary Punishments for noncompliance will have a positive impact on employees’ 
compliance with a company’s information security policy.  
 
H3: Monetary Rewards for compliance and monetary punishment for noncompliance 
together will have stronger positive impacts on employees’ behavior in complying with a 
company’s information security policy when compared with either a monetary reward 
only or a monetary punishment only policy.   
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3.3. Collective Sanctions 
Collective sanctions is a system such that rewards or punishments extend not only to the actors 
but to the actors’ groups (Heckathorn 1990).  In such systems, when an individual violates or 
complies with a rule, not merely the individual, but all other members of that person’s group as 
well, are collectively rewarded or punished by an external agent (Heckathorn 1988).  The 
literature summarized above assumes that individual rewards and punishments are two distinct 
and effective means to enhance compliance with an information security policy.  However, a few 
noncompliant employees, rather than the compliant majority, determine the level of a company’s 
information security defense.  The goal for an organization is to eliminate noncompliance.  
 
Modern organizations rarely use collective sanctions.  However, they are commonly used in U.S. 
military boot camps to enhance the effectiveness of control (Gilham 1982).  A more extreme 
application of collective sanctions occurred in Stalinist prisons (Dallin and Nicolaevsky 1947), 
where prisoners earned points through work and compliance with prison rules and the 
distribution of food, medicine, and other essentials of life depended on the points earned by the 
group.  The use of collective sanctions may not appeal to some employees, but an organization 
may improve compliance if the organization rewards all or punishes all when one or more 
employees is detected as complying, or not complying, with the organization’s information 
security policy incentives.  This payment structure might be more effective in maintaining 
compliance with an information security policy than traditional deterrence.   
 
3.4. Complete and Incomplete Monitoring 
 
As noted above, the treatments discussed thus far assume a company has complete information 
about employees’ information security policy compliance.  More realistically, a company usually 
relies on some sort of detection system (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems) to monitor the 
input/output information traffic to detect abnormal activities.  Khan, Awad and Thuraisingham 
(2007) shows that the detection accuracy rate could range from 11% to 95%.  Even the best 
detection systems are never perfect in a real-world setting.  In fact, research by computer 
scientists and computer engineers (Anderson, Frivold and Valdes 1995, Garcia-Teodoro et al. 
2009, Ilgun, Kemmerer and Porras 1995, Kumar and Spafford 1995, Lee and Stolfo 2000, 
Lippmann et al. 2000, Porras and Neumann 1997, Sequeira and Zaki 2002, Stolfo et al. 2001, 
Yu, Yang and Han 2003) still cannot identify a definitive accuracy rate of an Intrusion Detection 
Systems.   
 
In the context of information security policy compliance, a low chance of being caught could 
undermine the effect of rewards and punishments on employees’ compliance with an information 
security policy.  Boss et al. (2009) shows that if one knows he/she is being watched, he/she will 
follow the information security policy; otherwise, the rules will often be ignored.  Accordingly, 
this study considers the following hypotheses,  
 
H4: A reduction in the chance of being identified as not complying with an information 
security policy will have a negative impact on employees’ level of compliance with that 
policy. 
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H5: A reduction in the chance of being identified as not complying with an information 
security policy will reduce the positive effects of rewards for promoting employees’ level 
of compliance with that policy. 
 
H6: A reduction in the chance of being identified as not complying with an information 
security policy will reduce the positive effects of punishments for violating the policy.   
 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1. Scenario-based Security Compliance Measurement 
The papers by Sommestad et al. (2014) and Alaskar, Vodanovich and Shen (2015) point out that 
the survey is the predominant research method used in the management of information security 
literature.  However, it is well known that using self-reported data is biased, especially in 
studying anti-social and ethical/unethical behavior (Krumpal 2013).  Scenario-based methods, 
which ask subjects to imagine themselves as someone else may be effective in reducing self-
report bias (Pogarsky 2004).  In the field of Information Systems, scenario methods have been 
widely used to study various topics in information security research.  Myyry et al. (2009) use a 
single scenario to study the influence of being asked to think about moral responses on 
employees’ compliance with information security policies.  Cheng et al. (2013) also uses a single 
scenario test and develops an integrated model based on social control and deterrence theory to 
study information security policy violations.  D'Arcy, Hovav and Galletta (2009), Barlow et al. 
(2013), and Hu, West and Smarandescu (2015) use multiple scenarios to observe employees’ 
information compliance/noncompliance. Other papers randomly assign one scenario per 
participant (Chen, Ramamurthy and Wen 2012, D’Arcy and Hovav 2009, Guo and Yuan 2012, 
Guo et al. 2011, Harrington 1996, Hu et al. 2011, Vance and Siponen 2012).   
 
The scenario method offers distinct advantages for research on unethical or socially undesirable 
behavior, especially when participants do not respond directly about themselves.  Due to the 
secrecy involved in the undesirable behavior, individuals are more likely to conceal their real 
response to the questions and provide socially desirable answers to the researcher (Trevino 
1992).  However, a hypothetical scenario might make participants feel less reluctant to report 
their actual intentions when acting similarly to the person described in the scenario (Harrington 
1996).  Additionally, hypothetical scenarios drawn from experts could specify the situational 
details to enhance the realism of decision-making by providing contextual details (Alexander and 
Becker 1978).  While the scenario method does not have the external validity of experimental 
studies using induced values (Smith 1976), it has been accepted in the managerial literature as an 
improvement compared to surveys asking subjects to report on their own (possibly) non-
compliant behavior (Hu, West and Smarandescu 2015). 
 
This research, adopts the multiple scenarios of minor and major violations developed by Hu, 
West and Smarandescu (2015).  The scenario method also increases the generalizability of 
conclusions, as the large number of scenarios is more likely to capture some realistic situations.  
Each participant is instructed to imagine herself/himself as a hypothetical employee called 
“Josh” of a “company” and asked to answer a question posed in each of 30 scenarios as if the 
subject were Josh.  Hu, West and Smarandescu (2015) categorized each situation as either a 
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major or a minor information security violation. This study adopted 15 minor and 15 major 
hypothetical scenarios.4  Participants were presented with scenarios in a pseudorandom order 
(the order of the scenarios was randomized but consistent across all participants), omitting Hu et 
al.’s (2015) control group.  This strategy allowed the elimination of the possible effect of having 
different subjects see the scenarios in different orders. 
 
4.2. Real Dollar Incentives Compared to Hypothetical Incentives 
 
The literature review indicates that hypothetical scenario-based methods are widely used in the 
Information Systems field for studying information security research; however, experimental 
subjects in the IS literature are rarely paid different amounts which depend on their responses.  
Accordingly, this paper adopts the experimental economics approach of paying participants real 
money for responding to differential incentive scenarios.  This is a significant methodological 
contribution to the Information Systems literature, as a great deal of experimental economics 
research has shown that real dollars can completely change the results.    
 
Regarding group-level cooperation, Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange (2011) meta-analysis shows 
that both rewards and punishments are more effective when participants are actually paid for 
their decisions rather than when they make hypothetical decisions without monetary 
consequence.  Furthermore, incentives seem to matter more when the monetary stakes are greater 
(Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange 2011).  An organization’s practical problem in information 
security is to design a suitable and effective incentive structure to motivate employees to comply 
with the organization’s policies.  Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange (2011) paper further points out 
that real monetary incentives are more effective than hypothetical incentives.  Hoffman and 
Spitzer (1993), Shogren et al. (1994), and Binger, Copple and Hoffman (1995) also illustrate the 
importance of monetary incentives in human behavior studies.  The experimental economics 
approach should show how monetary rewards and punishments influence employees’ 
compliance with an information security policy. 
 
4.3. Research Design 
 
There are four designs in this study.  Design 1 is a basic 2x2 factorial design containing four 
groups of subjects.  It evaluates the effect of individual rewards and individual punishments on 
compliance with an organization’s information security policy. Subjects also know that not 
complying gives them personal benefits that depend on the severity of the infraction. In addition, 
we test if individual rewards and individual punishments together are not simply adding to one 
another, but rather have a super-additive effect.  Design 2, with three groups of participants, 
introduces collective sanctions (including collective rewards and collective punishments) to 
compare with design 1.  Design 2 explores how collective sanctions influence employees’ 
compliance.  Design 3, building upon design 1, uses the 2 x 2 factorial design, but there is only a 
20% chance that any one subject will be detected as complying or not complying with an 
organization’s information security policy. We consider how incomplete monitoring affects the 
degree to which subjects respond to the rewards, punishments, and personal benefits of non-
                                                 
4 Appendix A gives the scenarios in the order presented to our subjects. 
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compliance.  Lastly, design 4, with three groups of subjects, includes both collective sanctions 
and 20% monitoring.  Design 1 uses individual incentives, whereas designs 2-4 use group-based 
incentives.  Each group of 5 participants is determined randomly. The group members are fixed 
without reshuffling through the entire session.  Each session is composed with 30 
aforementioned scenarios and no participants are allowed to take more than one session in our 
experiments.   
 
Any choice of a particular set of rewards, punishments, and personal benefits is likely to affect 
the results. Thus, Design 1 is a starting point in studying the impact of monetary rewards and 
punishments on compliance with an information security policy. This study starts with a simple 
set of rewards, punishments, and personal benefits. Each participant starts with 500 endowment 
tokens (100 tokens = $1.3) to use in this study.  If a participant chooses “yes” after reading any 
given scenario, the participant is indicating that if s/he were “Josh,” s/he imagines s/he would 
engage in an activity that violates the company’s information security policy in the situation 
described in the scenario.  Answering “yes” gains a participant between 1 and 30 tokens, 
representing the personal benefits “Josh” gains from violating a company’s information security 
policy. Tokens gained by answering “yes” to any specific scenario are randomly selected from a 
uniform distribution from 1-9 for minor violations and 11-30 for major violations.  Hu, West and 
Smarandescu (2015) classified each of the 30 scenarios as minor or major.  In the absence of 
more information, each participant can assume that the expected value of answering “yes” to any 
scenario is 12.75 tokens. To keep the rewards and punishments close in value to the personal 
benefits, this study uses 10 tokens as either a reward for “Josh’s” compliance or a punishment for 
his non-noncompliance.  The wording, specific order, and personal benefits of answering “yes” 
to each scenario is in Appendix A.  The experimental instructions are in Appendix B.  The 
instructions are as neutral as possible, referring to punishments and rewards simply as changes to 
participants’ payoffs. Participants were able to keep track of their earnings in real time. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the Expected Value of payoffs (i.e., tokens) to participants in Design 1. 
 
Table 1 Design 1 Payoffs 
 EV NO EV Yes 
No Rewards or Punishments 0 12.75 
Rewards Only 10 12.75 
Punishments Only 0 2.75 
Both Rewards and Punishments 10 2.75 
 
All experiments were conducted using the oTree environmental Platform, an open-source 
Python- and Django-based platform for laboratory, online and field experiments (Chen, 
Schonger and Wickens 2016).   Table 2 presents an overview of the four designs with their 14 
treatment groups (See Appendix C for the specific designs of the treatments).   
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Table 2 Design Overview 
Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 Design 4 
Exp1C: Control  Exp3C: Control with 
20% Inspection 
 
Exp1R: Individual 
Reward (100% 
inspection) 
Exp2R: Collective 
Reward (100% 
inspection) 
Exp3R: Individual 
Reward with 20% 
Inspection  
Exp4R: Collective 
Reward with 20% 
Inspection 
Exp1P: Individual 
Punishment (100% 
inspection) 
Exp2P: Collective 
Punishment (100% 
inspection) 
Exp3P: Individual 
Punishment with 20% 
Inspection 
Exp4P: Collective 
Punishment with 20% 
Inspection 
Exp1RP: Individual 
Reward & 
Punishment (100% 
inspection) 
Exp2RP: Collective 
Reward & 
Punishment (100% 
inspection) 
Exp3RP: Individual 
Reward & 
Punishment with 20% 
Inspection  
Exp4PR: Collective 
Reward & 
Punishment with 20% 
Inspection  
 
5 Data Collection and Analysis 
5.1. Experimental Subjects and Data Collection 
Students at a major Midwestern U.S. university participated in this study. About half of the 
subjects were drawn from the business college subject pool and the rest of subjects were 
recruited from the general undergraduate population not in the business college. The questions 
included risk attitudes, impulsivity, age, gender, education, and other demographic variables.  
Siponen and Vance (2010) and Vance and Siponen (2012) considered differences in responses 
between students and information security professionals and did not find significant differences. 
They argue that students can be used as subjects to study compliance with information security 
policies.   
 
In total, 285 business school students participated. Students who showed up at the appointed time 
received course credit and $10 on average to complete the study.  Their final compensation 
depended on their task performance, which is incorporated in the designed treatments and was 
introduced in the Design section.   
 
The second population was the general undergraduate students (about 24,000), excluding 
business majors.  About 600 students signed up for the study and 360 students showed up at the 
study location. Those students who showed up received $5 for their participation, instead of the 
course credit given to the business students.  All other incentive and experimental treatments 
remained the same as for the first population.  No students from either population were permitted 
to participate in more than one design section. 
 
The data collection from the first population was conducted from the end of September to mid-
October, 2016. General students’ data from the second population was collected from late 
October to mid-November.  Each experimental session lasted about 45 minutes.   
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After consent forms were distributed, students were given whatever time they needed to read 
through and sign the forms.  Then, they went through the first part of the study, which is the 30 
scenario-based questions.  To enhance the saliency of the treatment manipulation, the core 
instruction about what would “Josh” do was repeatedly displayed underneath each scenario when 
participants were making their decisions. Additionally, the answering options (i.e., “Yes” or 
“No”) for each scenario were not displayed until 20 seconds had elapsed to enhance the 
treatment.   
 
After students made their decisions for each scenario, a current summary of tokens earned was 
displayed.  At the end, after all 30 scenarios, students were informed how much cash they would 
receive from the study.  Then, after all students finished the first part of the study, they filled out 
an online survey to gather their demographic information, risk assessment, risk preference, 
impulsivity assessment, computer skills and so on (see Appendix D for details).   
 
After all students finished their surveys, they were instructed to fill out the necessary paperwork 
for payment.  Then, they were instructed to log off their computers to ensure their privacy and to 
receive their payment (concealed in an individual envelop).    
 
5.2. Data-Analysis Procedure  
 
Each question allowed only two choices, “Yes” or “No.  “Yes” means advice that “Josh” should 
not comply; whereas, “No” means advice that “Josh” should comply with the information 
security policy.  To control for the potential effect caused by the different wording of 30 
scenarios, the treatment-effect data analysis was calculated as follows.  First, the scenario-based 
compliance ratio for each of 14 treatment groups was calculated.  The compliance ratio for each 
scenario in each treatment group is the proportion of participants who chose “No” divided by the 
total number of participants in that treatment group.  For example, the compliance ratio for 
Scenario 1 in the Control group of Design 1 (Exp1C) is 0.714286, since 35 out of 49 subjects 
chose “No” in this treatment group.   
 
Second, the pair-wise difference of compliance ratio (DCR) between each of the 14 treatment 
groups was calculated.  This was done to control for the potential effects of 30 differently 
worded scenarios.  For example, the compliance ratio of Exp1R for Scenario 1 is 0.808511.  
Hence, the DCR between Exp1R and Exp1C is 0.094225 for Scenario 1. This is the individual 
Reward treatment effect (without the confounding caused by scenario wording) compared with 
the basic control group.  Third, a time series data analysis was conducted to test if the series (i.e., 
30 scenarios) of DCR numbers are not equal to zero.  Particularly, an autoregressive model5 with 
AR=1 was employed because each treatment group’s current decision might be correlated to its 
previous decision through the 30-repeated observations (i.e., 30 scenario questions), as each 
subject was shown the scenario questions in the same order.  Finally, the t-statistic and p-value of 
the constant term in the time-series data analysis were calculated to determine if the respective 
treatment had an effect.   
                                                 
5 ARIMA model with orders of (1,0,0), (1,0,1), (1,0,2), (2,0,1), and (2,0,2) were also tested for each series of DCR 
to obtain the best fitting models by AIC index.  For the sake of model concise and parsimonious, an AR=1 
autoregressive model was adapted to report in this paper, as essentially the best fitting models provide the same 
data-analysis results.  The ARIMA data-analysis results will be provided upon request.   
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In addition, a logistic regression with dummy codes to control for scenario differences, using the 
number of “No” answers by each individual as the dependent variable, was estimated. This 
regression tested whether participants’ demographic and other control variables impacted their 
decisions to choose “No”.   
 
6. Experimental Results and Discussions  
The overall experimental results are summarized in Table 3.  It shows the coefficient and p-value 
of the constant term of the autoregressive model for all DCR combinations.  The complete output 
of the AR=1 model is attached in Appendix E.  In our time series data analysis, the constant term 
represents the estimated difference of two means between their respective treatment groups.  For 
example, the estimated difference between Exp3C and Exp1C is -0.038 with a p-value as 0.015, 
which indicates that a low chance of being detected has a significantly negative impact on 
information security compliance compared with the most basic control group (1C).   
 
Table 3 Experimental Results Overview 
Mean.diff 
&  
p-value 
Exp1
P 
Exp1
R 
Exp1R
P 
Exp2
P 
Exp2
R 
Exp2R
P 
Exp3
C 
Exp3
P 
Exp3
R 
Exp3R
P 
Exp4
P 
Exp4
R 
Exp4R
P 
Exp1C 0.026 0.101 0.193 -0.091 -0.150 0.016 -0.038 -0.087 0.035 0.022 -0.123 0.063 0.057 
0.210 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.465 0.015 0.003 0.213 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.018 
Exp1P   0.074 0.167 -0.118 -0.179 -0.014 -0.063 -0.117 0.005 -0.008 -0.150 0.036 0.028 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.635 0.000 0.000 0.877 0.777 0.000 0.131 0.268 
Exp1R     0.093 -0.192 -0.252 -0.087 -0.138 -0.191 -0.069 -0.083 -0.224 -0.039 -0.046 
    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.004 0.000 0.121 0.066 
Exp1RP      -0.285 -0.345 -0.180 -0.231 -0.283 -0.162 -0.175 -0.317 -0.131 -0.139 
      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exp2P         -0.060 0.106 0.053 0.002 0.124 0.112 -0.032 0.156 0.149 
        0.000 0.000 0.001 0.904 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Exp2R           0.168 0.110 0.064 0.187 0.174 0.028 0.215 0.211 
          0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 
Exp2RP             -0.054 -0.103 0.020 0.006 -0.139 0.048 0.041 
            0.034 0.000 0.220 0.702 0.000 0.006 0.037 
Exp3C               -0.050 0.072 0.059 -0.085 0.101 0.095 
              0.121 0.031 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exp3P                 0.123 0.110 -0.035 0.151 0.146 
                0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Exp3R                   -0.013 -0.158 0.029 0.022 
                  0.452 0.000 0.114 0.249 
Exp3RP                     -0.146 0.041 0.037 
                    0.000 0.002 0.000 
Exp4P                       0.188 0.183 
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                      0.000 0.000 
Exp4R                         -0.005 
                        0.733 
 
6.1. Design 1 Results and Discussion  
Design 1 was conducted to identify how individual reward and punishment with 100% detection, 
influenced employees’ compliance.  The estimated difference of Exp1P – Exp1C is 0.026 with a 
p-value of 0.210. This comparison indicates that individual punishment has no significant 
impact, when compared with the control group.  In other words, with 100% detection, imposing 
individual punishment to noncompliant behavior does not statistically improve employees’ 
compliance with an information security policy.  Hence, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  This 
result suggests that the deterrence only strategy may not effectively prevent insider data 
breaches. 
 
However, the estimated difference of Exp1R – Exp1C is 0.101 and highly significant with a p-
value less than 0.001.  This indicates that individual reward, with 100% detection, works well for 
regulating employees’ noncompliant behavior.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  In 
addition, comparing Exp1RP and Exp1C, indicates a positive difference in estimated means 
(0.193) and an extremely small p-value (< 0.001).  Furthermore, the estimated difference of 
Exp1RP – Exp1P is 0.167 (p-value < 0.001) and Exp1RP – Exp1R is 0.093 (p-value < 0.001).  
This illustrates that, with 100% detection, individual reward and punishment together is 
significantly better than either individual punishment or individual reward.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 
is strongly supported.  This finding is consistent with Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) 
stating, “the absence of a reward is not equivalent to a punishment.”  Based on these results, 
when the ability to detect non-compliance is 100%, designing an incentive mechanism around 
punishment only and omitting reward is a mistake, although such a strategy is commonly used in 
current information security practice.   
 
Comparing individual reward and individual punishment in complying with an information 
security policy, the estimated difference of Exp1R – Exp1P is positively significant with a p-
value less than 0.001.  This result indicates that, with 100% detection, reward is more powerful 
than punishment in preventing insider data breaches caused by employees.  This is an interesting 
result, although the extant majority literature asserts that perceived punishment is more effective 
than perceived reward (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and Benbasat 2009, Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu and 
Benbasat 2010, Liang, Xue and Wu 2013, Pahnila, Siponen and Mahmood 2007, Siponen, 
Pahnila and Mahmood 2010, Vance, Siponen and Pahnila 2012).  This literature all used 
uncompensated surveys as the measurement instruments.  The uncompensated survey method 
suffers from self-report bias. Survey takers tend to provide socially desirable answers to 
questionnaires (Krumpal 2013).  In addition, the survey method tends to ask participants about 
information security compliance in general. It is almost impossible to capture an employee’s 
actual thought when facing temptations.  Instead, the compensated approach outlined in this 
paper reveals the superior power of real dollar reward compared with real dollar punishment in 
an information security policy compliance setting.   
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Although violating an information security policy is a socially undesirable/unethical, even illegal 
behavior,  a company frequently delegates the compliant responsibility to employees’ ethics or 
moral standards (Herath and Rao 2009).  Accordingly, deterrence is commonly used to enhance 
such effect when one’s ethical or moral obligation is weak.  However, employees may not 
actually perceive the security policy that way, especially when facing time pressure or 
temptations.  Puhakainen (2006) argue that employees perceive that the security policy slows 
down their work with added procedures.  The results summarized in this paper, suggest that 
paying a little extra reward to prevent huge data breaches is more beneficial than relying on 
punishment alone.   
 
6.2. Design 2 Results and Discussion 
Design 2 was conducted to study how collective sanctions (collective reward and collective 
punishment) influence employees’ compliant behavior.  Based on Table 3’s statistical results, it 
seems that in general collective sanctions have negative impacts on employees’ compliance.  The 
estimated difference of Exp2P – Exp1C is -0.091 with a p-value less than 0.001 and the 
estimated difference of Exp2R – Exp1C is -0.150 with a p-value less than 0.001.  This result 
indicates that a company is better off relying on employees’ conscience or moral standards rather 
than using collective rewards or collective punishments.  This might be the reason why it is very 
rare to see an American company either reward all their employees, when they are all complying, 
or punish all, including complaint employees, when someone is violating the security policy.   
 
The impact of collective sanctions on employees’ security compliance can be estimated by 
comparing individual reward with collective reward and individual punishment with collective 
punishment.  Specifically, the estimated difference of Exp2P – Exp1P is -0.118 with a p-value 
less than 0.001 and the estimated difference of Exp2R – Exp1R is -0.252 with a p-value is less 
than 0.001.  The estimated difference of Exp2RP – Exp1RP is -0.180 with a p-value is less than 
0.001.  All these results indicate that collective sanctions, with 100% detection, are less effective 
than individual sanctions (i.e., individual reward or/and individual punishment) in this research 
setting.   
 
6.3. Design 3 Results and Discussion 
So far, the impact of rewards and punishments on employees’ security compliance has been 
studied in a perfect detection environment.  However, as pointed out earlier, real-world detection 
systems are not 100% effective.  Design 3 was conducted to understand how a low chance of 
detection influences employees’ compliance behavior.  The estimated difference of Exp3C – 
Exp1C is -0.038 with a significant p-value of 0.015.  This result supports Hypothesis 4, as a low 
chance of detection has a negative impact on employees’ compliance with a company’s 
information security policy.  Furthermore, the estimated difference of Exp3P – Exp1P is -0.117 
with a p-value less than 0.001, the estimated difference of Exp3R – Exp1R is -0.069 with a p-
value of 0.043, and the estimated difference of Exp3RP – Exp1RP is -0.175 with a p-value less 
than 0.001.  These results strongly support Hypotheses 5 and 6 that a low chance of detection 
undermines the regulating power of individual reward or/and individual punishment.   
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Interestingly, individual punishment with a low probability of detection is no better than the 
control group with a low probability of detection, as the estimated difference of Exp3P – Exp3C 
is -0.050 with a p-value of 0.121.  Meanwhile, individual reward and punishment, together with a 
low probability of detection, is also no better than individual reward only with low probability of 
detection: the estimated difference of Exp3RP – Exp3R is not significant with a p-value of 0.452.  
This finding suggests a company needs to enhance its deterrence certainty to prevent insider data 
breaches if the punishment mechanism is adapted, although we found that punishment only is not 
effective to prevent noncompliance.  
 
6.4. Design 4 Results and Discussion 
Design 4 combined a low probability of detection and collective sanctions.  The estimated 
difference of Exp4P – Exp1C is negative (-0.123) with a p-value less than 0.001.  However, the 
estimated difference of Exp4R – Exp1C is 0.063 with a p-value less than 0.001 and the estimated 
difference of Exp4RP – Exp1C is 0.057 with a p-value of 0.018.  These results suggest that 
collective punishment with a low probability of detection is worse than the control group with 
100% detection.  However, collective reward with a low probability of detection outperforms the 
most basic control group, which relies on employees’ perceived obligation for compliance.  This 
can be a very realistic and practical incentive structure for a company to prevent its employees 
from violating information security policy.  In order words, in an imperfect detecting 
environment of information security, company can reduce insider security breaches by rewarding 
employees monetary bonus.   
 
Although these results are inconsistent with the findings about the general negative effect of 
collective sanctions in Design 2, when detection is certain; it is still interesting to learn that 
collective reward is superior and collective punishment is inferior even with a low probability of 
detection.  This also demonstrates that the interactions between collective sanctions and a low 
probability of detection are not simple additive relationships, as both collective reward and 
collective punishment would be worse than the control group after controlling for the large 
uncertainty influence.  Rather, the low chance of detection transforms the collective reward 
mechanism and differentiates its regulating power from collective punishment.   
 
In addition, after controlling for the detection effect by comparing Design 4 with Design 3, we 
can learn how the low probability of detection changes the relationship between collective 
sanctions and individual sanctions.  The estimated difference of Exp4P – Exp3P is negative 
(-.035) with a p-value of 0.012, which suggests that collective punishment is worse than 
individual punishment with a low probability of detection.  This is consistent with a previous 
finding with 100% detection.  On the contrary, collective reward is slightly better than individual 
reward with a low probability of detection: the estimated difference of Exp4R – Exp3R is 0.029 
with a p-value of 0.114 (one tail is 0.057).  Furthermore, the estimated mean of Exp4RP – 
Exp3RP is also positive (0.037) with a p-value less than 0.001.  This means that collective 
reward and punishment together is better than individual reward and punishment together when 
there is a low probability of detection.   
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Comparing Design 4 with Design 2, the only difference between these two experiments is 
certainty of detection. A low probability of detection has a negative impact on collective 
punishment, but a positive impact on collective reward.  These can be shown by the fact that 
estimated difference of Exp4P – Exp2P is negative (-0.032) with a p-value of 0.004, but the 
expected difference of Exp4R – Exp2R is positive (0.215) with a p-value less than 0.001.  In 
addition, the estimated difference of Exp4RP – Exp2RP is 0.041 with a p-value of 0.037.  This 
indicates that collective reward and punishment together is more effective if the probability of 
detection is low. When the probability of detection is low and therefore punishment is uncertain, 
people tend to commit more security violations.  Collective sanctions mean that everyone 
receives punishment, including compliant people, as long as someone in the inspection list is 
noncompliant.  Whereas, everyone receives a reward, including noncompliant ones, when 
everyone in the inspection list is compliant.  Therefore, under collective rewards, there is no 
chance of compliant employees losing rewards.   Considering the results in Design 4, collective 
rewards with a small probability of detection outperforms collective punishment with small 
probability of detection: the estimated difference of Exp4R – Exp4P equal to 0.188, with a p-
value less than 0.001.  Moreover, the expected difference of Exp4RP – Exp4R is not significant, 
with a p-value of 0.733; therefore, collective reward and punishment together with a small 
probability of detection is no better than collective reward only with a small probability of 
detection.  This further demonstrates that reward is the preferred mechanism to regulate insider 
data breaches even in a collective environment with a low probability of detection.      
 
7. Robustness, Demographic and Personal Characteristic Variables 
 
Table 4 presents logit regression results for participants’ compliance with an information security 
policy.  The dependent variable is each participant’s answer of “No” (1) or “Yes” (0) to each 
scenario. The independent variables include the participants’ demographic and personal 
characteristic variables; each participant’s Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion measurement; 
and coded dummy variables 1 to 30 to control for the potential effects caused by the wording of 
30 different scenarios. 
 
Table 4 Logit Regression Results for Information Security Policy Compliance  
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Exp1C 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) 
Exp1P 0.0270 0.0263 0.0407 
 (0.0561) (0.0540) (0.0574) 
Exp1R 0.101+ 0.108* 0.117* 
 (0.0572) (0.0526) (0.0565) 
Exp1RP 0.194*** 0.183*** 0.202*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0510) (0.0542) 
Exp2P -0.0917 -0.0919+ -0.0712 
 (0.0591) (0.0538) (0.0578) 
Exp2R -0.152** -0.137* -0.140* 
 (0.0540) (0.0544) (0.0556) 
Exp2RP 0.0148 0.0133 0.0329 
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 (0.0615) (0.0571) (0.0609) 
Exp3C -0.0377 -0.0380 -0.0222 
 (0.0590) (0.0529) (0.0571) 
Exp3P -0.0881 -0.0968+ -0.0737 
 (0.0553) (0.0526) (0.0575) 
Exp3R 0.0348 0.0367 0.0475 
 (0.0586) (0.0570) (0.0587) 
Exp3RP 0.0215 0.0259 0.0377 
 (0.0596) (0.0557) (0.0606) 
Exp4P -0.124* -0.0941+ -0.100+ 
 (0.0561) (0.0527) (0.0556) 
Exp4R 0.0630 0.0729 0.0878 
 (0.0609) (0.0583) (0.0622) 
Exp4RP 0.0578 0.0493 0.0698 
 (0.0638) (0.0595) (0.0627) 
    
Scenario Difference Controlled Controlled Controlled 
    
Risk Taking  -0.0367***  
  (0.00870)  
Impulsivity  -0.0330***  
  (0.00957)  
HL Risk Aversion  0.00206 0.00837+ 
  (0.00481) (0.00500) 
Age  0.0227* 0.0266** 
  (0.0101) (0.00992) 
Business Major  -0.00329 0.00148 
  (0.0215) (0.0221) 
Non-business Major  0 0 
  (.) (.) 
Computer Hours  0.00898+ 0.00802 
  (0.00531) (0.00550) 
Gender  - - 
Dominant Hand  - - 
Computer Skills  - - 
Class  - - 
GPA  - - 
Race  - - 
Organizational Experience  - - 
Note: Marginal Effects (dy/dx) with Standard Errors in parentheses; N.A. stands for No Answer; 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
“-“ means the variable is controlled in the model but omitted for reporting due to its insignificant value 
 
The most basic control group (i.e., Exp1C in Design 1) was the base for the categorical variables 
in the logit regression to test the treatment effects after controlling for the scenario differences in 
Model 1.  Exp1RP, Exp2R, and Exp4P are significantly different from Exp1C. Exp1R is weakly 
significant at the 0.1 level, for compliance as well.  These results are consistent with the time 
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series autoregressive model test for DCR: the same direction (i.e., sign) of numbers between the 
marginal effects of the logit regression and the expected difference of DCR (the first row of 
Table 3) in the time series analysis.  Careful readers may wonder why the time series analysis 
shows more significant values than the logit regression.  This is because the standard errors for 
the treatment effects are more precise when the unit of analysis is the treatment group.  As our 
research question is about compliance behavior in the workplace as a group, using an individual 
person as the unit of analysis for studying treatment effects is not appropriate, although it can 
permit us to study individual differences related to compliance.  Furthermore, the standard errors 
caused by other unobserved variables of individual difference average out when we use the 
treatment group as the unit of analysis, providing more accurate statistical test results for 
treatment effects.    
 
The logit regression with demographic and personal traits is Model 2 of Table 4.  Interestingly, 
the significance level and the sign of marginal effects did not change much, except the 
coefficient for Exp1R is now significant, the p-value increasing from 0.1 to 0.05 and Exp3P 
becomes marginally significant at the 0.1 level.  This means that those demographic and personal 
traits variables should be orthogonal to the treatment variables for information security 
compliance.  This further demonstrates the robustness of results from the time series analysis.   
 
In addition, risk taking is negatively significant at the 0.001 level.  This suggests that risk-loving 
employees are more likely to violate an information security policy.  Furthermore, impulsivity is 
also negatively significant.  Impulsive people were defined by Hu, West and Smarandescu 
(2015) as the individuals who do not take adequate time to evaluate inputs before making a 
decision.  Hence, it makes sense that impulsive employees tend to violate information security 
policies more.  Moreover, age is another significant factor for security compliance.  The positive 
coefficient of age suggests that older employees are more likely to comply with an information 
security policy.   
 
However, gender, dominant hand, computer skills, education level and grades, ethnicity, as well 
as organizational experience have no significant impact on information security compliance, 
although number of hours on the computer per day seems to have a weak effect.  This may very 
well explain why insider data breaches happen so frequently no matter the workplace 
environment (e.g., companies, governmental sectors, universities, or other nonprofit 
organizations).  It is worth noting that business majors are no different from non-business majors 
for information security compliance.   
 
Unexpectedly, the Holt and Laury (2002)’s risk aversion’s measurement is not significant in 
Model 2. This result may be due to multicollinearity with risk taking and impulsivity.  Hence, 
Model 3 omits both risk taking and impulsivity.  Then, risk aversion becomes weakly significant 
with a positive sign.  The positive value suggests that risk-averse individuals are more likely to 
comply with an information security policy.  In addition, Model 3 represents almost the same 
regression results as Model 2, even without two significant factors.  This further shows that the 
demographic and personal traits are independent of the treatment variables for information 
security compliance.  Therefore, it further demonstrates the robustness of the results from the 
time series data analysis.    
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252742 
 20 
 
8. Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
 
Information security is important to study both as academic research as well as for industry 
practice.  Although there has been much research into information security, including both 
technological defense and policy regulations, data breaches seem to become more and more 
common and harder to prevent.  Much literature has identified that human factors, particularly 
employees’ noncompliance with information security policies, are the fundamental causes of 
data breaches, as insider employees are the weakest part of security defense.   
 
This paper aims to design a realistic incentive structure to help a company protect its information 
assets.  This study is the first attempt to use behavioral economics techniques to explore how 
individual sanctions, collective sanctions, and detection mechanisms influence employees’ 
compliance with a company’s information security policy.  The nature and complexity of 
individual reward, collective reward, individual punishment, collective punishment, a small 
probability of detection, and their interactions gradually unfolded through a series of sequential 
lab experiments.  The following conclusions can be drawn from these experimental results.   
 
First, individual reward and punishment together with 100% detection is the best strategy for a 
company to regulate its employees’ noncompliance.  The superior performance of Exp1RP 
compared to every other strategy demonstrates this finding.  The complementary effect between 
reward and punishment is very strong, and thus omitting either one could be a mistake.  
Therefore, a company should always employ both means to achieve better regulating power, 
although it may cost the company to give rewards.    
 
Second, individual reward is always better than individual punishment for security compliance.  
This suggests a company should rethink its managerial policy if it is deterrence based.  Why do 
people break rules even though they know it is wrong?  Don’t employees understand that it is 
their obligation to obey the policy?  It seems that employee’s perception of security procedure is 
not in line with the company’s.  Hence, giving a small reward for compliant behavior aligns both 
parties’ interests.  Third, collective sanctions are a complex incentive mechanism.  A company 
should use them with great caution.  Fourth, a low probability of detection undermines the 
incentive power of individual rewards or/and individual punishments.  Hence, a company must 
improve its detection systems to take full advantage of individual sanctions.  This requires the 
joint effort of a company’s technical team and managerial leadership.  In addition, a low 
probability of detection weakens the value of punishment more than it does for reward.  A 
company is better off either not using punishment at all or be able to detect 100% of non-
compliant behavior; otherwise, punishment with a low probability of detection is worse than no 
punishment.  Instead, if there is a low probability of detection, it is better to rely on reward.  But, 
combining reward and punishment is superior to either reward or punishment.   
 
Finally, a company should avoid hiring risk-loving, impulsive, and junior people (if possible) for 
key information security positions. To avoid discriminating against young people, a company 
might not hire applicants who score high on a measure of risk loving. Those employees may 
pose stronger threats to a company’s security defense and their compliance may not be easily 
improved by rewards or punishments.            
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Appendix A: 30 Scenarios for Information Security Policy Violations*  
 
Scenario # 
[unknown 
to 
participants] 
Severity 
(personal 
benefits) 
[unknown to 
participants] 
Scenario Content and Decision-making Question 
[known to participant] 
Scenario 1 Minor (1 tokens) 
Josh’s mentor Mary is worried about her job security and 
wanted to know if her position is among those that are being 
considered for elimination. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?       
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 2 Minor (2 tokens) 
Josh received an e-mail from his college professor who asked 
Josh to talk about the details of IT security management, which 
is considered confidential, in a seminar. 
Should Josh honor his professor’s request? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 3 Major (27 tokens) 
Josh’s boss Christine wanted to know the compensation 
information of the top executives in the company. Josh could 
earn substantial favors from Christine. 
Should Josh access the secure server and get the data for 
Christine?  
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 4 Major (19 tokens) 
Josh’s company is about to release quarterly earnings. If he can 
act early before the information is public, he could make a 
substantial profit on the stock market. 
Should Josh find out the earnings data and act accordingly?       
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 5 Major (26 tokens) 
Jeff is an IT consultant Josh met at a seminar. Jeff wants a copy 
of the detailed computer network map of the company, and 
offers Josh a chance of making a substantial amount of money 
on a consulting project.        
Should Josh provide the map? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 6 Major (22 tokens) 
Josh’s buddy Mike, who works in the sales department, wanted 
to know the prices of competitors for similar products to those 
he is selling, and promised to share commission.   
Should Josh access competitors’ computers and find the data?       
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 7 Minor (1 tokens) 
Josh’s brother-in-law Kevin, who is a salesperson for a local 
firm, wanted to know if a particular type of material is used in 
the new product under development. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?       
No?       Yes? 
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Scenario 8 Major (21 tokens) 
At a dinner with friends, Josh was introduced to a stranger who 
asked if Josh knows the bidding price of a component from 
suppliers, and promised to share commission. 
Should Josh get the price for this stranger?    
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 9 Major (26 tokens) 
Josh’s girlfriend Jenny, who works for a consulting firm, 
wanted to have some information about suppliers. Jenny could 
earn a substantial amount of commission. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data for 
Jenny? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 10 Minor (4 tokens) 
Josh has invested a significant portion of his money in his 
company stock. The new product under development is going to 
have a significant impact on the stock price. 
Should Josh find internal documents about the new product?      
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 11 Major (30 tokens) 
Josh’s mentor Mary was laid off due to downsizing. Josh is 
very upset about this and considering doing something to take 
revenge. 
Should Josh delete crucial computer files to vent his anger?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 12 Major (17 tokens) 
Josh’s friend Mike, who works for an investment firm, wanted 
to know the quarterly earnings data before public release, and 
promised to share any profit from this data. 
Should Josh access the secure server and get the data for Mike? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 13 Major (27 tokens) 
Josh has been upset about not receiving an anticipated salary 
increase in the last annual evaluation. He knows some 
underground websites offering to pay for credit card data. 
Should Josh sell customer credit card information?    
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 14 Minor (8 tokens) 
Josh’s buddy Mike, who works for an investment firm, wanted 
to know how close a new product under development is in 
commercial production. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 15 Minor (1 tokens) 
Josh met Frank at an industry conference in Las Vegas. Frank 
asks Josh if he could give him the IP address of a highly 
protected computer server for testing. 
Should Josh find out the IP address for Frank?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 16 Major (26 tokens) 
Josh belongs to a citizens’ group that advocates hiring local 
workers. The group wants Josh to provide some confidential 
evidence to support a lawsuit. Josh would share any settlement 
money if the group wins. 
Should Josh provide the confidential data to the group?    
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No?       Yes? 
Scenario 17 Major (23 tokens) 
Josh’s brother-in-law Kevin, who is a salesperson for a local 
firm, wanted to get contract information of suppliers, and 
promised to share a substantial amount of commission.   
Should Josh get the information for Kevin? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 18 Minor (8 tokens) 
Josh’s girlfriend Jenny, who works for a consulting firm, 
wanted to know whether one of her clients is involved in the 
new product development with his firm. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 19 Major (15 tokens) 
Josh met Frank at an industry conference in Las Vegas. Frank 
asks Josh if he could give him the IP address of a highly 
protected computer server for testing, and promises to help Josh 
find consulting work. 
Should Josh give Frank the information?      
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 20 Major (20 tokens) 
Josh must complete a project by this Friday and one way to 
speed up the progress is to copy source code from other 
companies that he knows have done similar projects. 
Should Josh hack into a competitor’s computer and copy the 
code? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 21 Minor (5 tokens) 
Josh’s best friend Eric, who works for a competitor, wanted to 
know whether a new product under development has certain 
features. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 22 Major (27 tokens) 
Josh’s friend Julie, who is an HR manager, asks Josh to find the 
payroll information of peer companies for her benchmark study, 
and promises Josh to help in the future. 
Should Josh access the payroll data on peer companies’ 
servers?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 23 Minor (2 tokens) 
Josh belongs to a citizens’ group that advocates hiring local 
workers. The group wanted to confirm whether Josh’s company 
is outsourcing jobs to offshore suppliers. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find it out?   
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 24 Minor (8 tokens) 
The only way for Josh to meet the deadline this Friday is to 
bring some files home to work on his computer in the evenings, 
which is explicitly prohibited by the company. 
Should Josh bring the files home and work on his computer? 
No?       Yes? 
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Scenario 25 Minor (5 tokens) 
Josh is not sure how much he should be asking for a salary raise 
or even if he should be asking at all given the financial situation 
of the company. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find more 
information?   
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 26 Minor (4 tokens) 
Josh’s friend, Jane, works in the HR department as a payroll 
specialist. Jane asked Josh to change the payroll data file to 
erase the unpaid vacation hours she had taken. 
Should Josh make the changes on the server for Jane?   
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 27 Major (16 tokens) 
Josh’s buddy Eric, who works for a competitor, wanted to get a 
critical design in the new product under development, and 
promises to pay a substantial amount of money. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data for Eric? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 28 Minor (3 tokens) 
Josh’s boss Christine wanted to know about the executive 
compensation information of the company, which is 
confidential. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?       
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 29 Minor (4 tokens) 
At a dinner with friends Josh was introduced to a stranger who 
asked if Josh knows the price of a component for which Josh’s 
company is requesting bids from suppliers. 
Should Josh get the price on a secure server for this stranger?    
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 30 Minor (2 tokens) 
Josh’s buddy Mike, who works in the sales department of the 
same company, wanted to know if another account manager in 
the company is about to close a major deal. 
Should Josh access the secure server and get the information?       
No?       Yes? 
 
 
*All 30 scenarios were adapted from Hu, West and Smarandescu (2015).   
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Appendix B: Experiment Instructions 
 
General Introduction 
Thank you for participating in this study, and please read the following instructions carefully. If 
you have any questions, do not hesitate to ask us. Aside from this, no communication is allowed 
during the experiment. 
 
This study is about information security and decision making. You MUST be least 18 years old 
to participate. This lab session is completely anonymous and will take approximately 45 minutes 
to complete. You will earn $10 on average and your final compensation may vary depending on 
your decisions made on the study tasks. Everything will be paid to you in cash/check 
immediately after the experiment. 
 
Now, you are given 500 endowment tokens to participate in this study and imagine that you are 
an employee, named Josh: [Core Instruction] 
Josh works for the IT department of a large global manufacturing company that 
supplies sophisticated electronic control instruments for civilian and military 
uses. Over the years Josh has developed knowledge and skills that enable him to 
access almost any computer and database in his company with or without 
authorization. 
 
[Exp1C] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized 
access, copy, transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-
confidential data. 
 
Josh has been working on multiple projects recently, some with deadlines in one 
or two weeks. Josh is under tremendous pressure to meet the deadlines of his 
boss. Josh is also financially stressed and he is behind in some payments for his 
bills and credit cards. For each of the given circumstances, Josh will gain some 
benefits from 0 to 30 tokens if he chooses to do things that are favorable to him or 
his friends. The more severe of the scenarios, the more profits Josh would obtain. 
 
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all 
subsequent screens of this study. 
 
Again, imagine that you are Josh and complete a number of scenario-based tasks on 
behalf of Josh on the following screens. Josh’s final income of tokens from the 
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experiment will be converted to dollars and given to you at the end of the study. The 
exchange rate is 100 tokens = $1.3. 
 
Now, please write down the three-digit random number which is given to you in the 
beginning of the study to start the lab: ______________________________ 
 
Interventions for Design 1-4  
All other is the same as illustrated above except for the paragraph labeled as “[Exp1C]”.  The 
rest treatments of our four designs are listed as the followings: 
 
[Exp1R] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to give 10 tokens to those employees who are protecting 
the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp1P] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to deduct 10 tokens from those employees who are not 
protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp1RP] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to give 10 tokens to those employees who are protecting 
the company’s information assets, but deduct 10 tokens from those employees who are not 
protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp2R] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to give 10 tokens to all employees only when all 
employees are protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp2P] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to deduct 10 tokens from all employees as long as 
someone is not protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp2RP] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to give 10 tokens to all employees only when all 
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employees are protecting the company’s information assets, but deduct 10 tokens from all 
employees as long as someone is not protecting the company’s information assets for each 
circumstance. 
 
[Exp3C] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. 
 
[Exp3R] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to give 10 tokens to those selected employees who are protecting the company’s information 
assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp3P] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to deduct 10 tokens from those selected employees who are not protecting the company’s 
information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp3RP] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to give 10 tokens to those selected employees who are protecting the company’s information 
assets, but deduct 10 tokens from those selected employees who are not protecting the company’s 
information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp4R] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to give 10 tokens to all employees only when all selected employees are protecting the 
company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp4P] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to deduct 10 tokens from all employees as long as someone among the selected employees is not 
protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
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[Exp4RP] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to give 10 tokens to all employees only when all selected employees are protecting the 
company’s information assets, but deduct 10 tokens from all employees as long as someone 
among the selected employees is not protecting the company’s information assets for each 
circumstance. 
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Appendix C: Detailed Experimental Design 
 
Design 1    
In this experiment, we simply examine how reward and punishment influence participants’ 
decision making.  A 2 x 2 factorial design is presented here, 
 
Control group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, oTree records 
their choices.  In addition, participants are informed that they have a chance to earn an additional 
0 to 30 tokens if they choose “Yes”.   
 
Reward only group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, oTree 
adds 10 tokens if the subject chooses “No”.  No tokens are given to those subjects who choose 
“Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to 
those subjects who choose “Yes”.   
 
Punishment only group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, oTree 
deducts 10 tokens if the subject chooses “Yes”.  No tokens are given to those subjects who 
choose “No”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still 
applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes”.   
 
Reward & Punishment group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, 
oTree adds 10 tokens if the subject chooses “No” and deducts 10 tokens if the subject chooses 
“Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to 
those subjects who choose “Yes”.   
 
Design 2 
In this experiment, we introduce the Collective Sanctions (rewarding all or punishing all) to 
compare the results with Experiment 1’s.  Since the Collective Sanctions only exist when main 
treatments (Reward or Punishment) are given, there is no control group in this experiment.   
 
Collective Reward only group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, 
oTree adds 10 tokens to every subject only when no subjects choose “Yes”.  No tokens are given 
to subjects under any other circumstances.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as 
aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes”.   
 
Collective Punishment only group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each 
scenario, oTree deducts 10 tokens from every subject as long as there are subjects choosing 
“Yes”.  No tokens will be given to subjects under any other circumstances.  Additionally, the 
chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose 
“Yes”.   
 
Collective Reward & Punishment group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each 
scenario, oTree adds 10 tokens to every subject only when no subjects choose “Yes.”  oTree 
deducts 10 tokens from every subject as long as there are subjects choosing “Yes”.  Additionally, 
the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who 
choose “Yes”.   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252742 
 35 
 
 
Design 3 
In this experiment, we examine how reward and punishment influence participants’ decision 
making when there is uncertainty that only 20% of them will be inspected.  Another 2 x 2 
factorial design is presented here, 
 
Control with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made their decisions, 
the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their choices.  Those 
examined participants are informed that their decisions are captured by the “company”, but no 
tokens are taken from or given to those selected participants.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 
to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether 
they are selected or not.   
 
Reward only with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made their 
decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their choices.  
oTree adds 10 tokens to the selected ones if they choose “No”.  No tokens are given to those 
selected subjects who choose “Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as 
aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected 
or not.   
 
Punishment only with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made their 
decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their choices.  
oTree deducts 10 tokens from the selected ones if they choose “Yes”.  No tokens are given to 
those selected subjects who choose “No”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as 
aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected 
or not.   
 
Reward & Punishment with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made 
their decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their 
choices.  oTree adds 10 tokens to the selected ones if they choose “No” and deducts 10 tokens 
from the selected ones if they choose “Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as 
aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected 
or not.   
 
Design 4 
In this experiment, we introduce the Collective Sanctions (rewarding all or punishing all) again 
based on Experiment 3.  Since the Collective Sanctions only exist when main treatments 
(Reward or Punishment) are given, there is no control group in this experiment, either. 
 
Collective Reward only with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made 
their decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their 
choices.  oTree adds 10 tokens to everyone, including non-selected subjects, if no selected 
subjects choose “Yes”.  No tokens are given to subjects under any other circumstances.  
Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those 
subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected or not.   
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Collective Punishment only with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have 
made their decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine 
their choices.  oTree deducts 10 tokens from everyone, including non-selected subjects, if one or 
more selected subjects choose “Yes”.  No tokens are given to subjects under any other 
circumstances.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still 
applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected or not.   
 
Collective Reward & Punishment with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects 
have made their decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to 
examine their choices.  oTree adds 10 tokens to everyone, including non-selected subjects, if no 
selected subjects choose “Yes” or oTree deducts 10 tokens from everyone, including non-
selected subjects, if one or more selected subjects choose “Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to 
gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” 
whether they are selected or not.   
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Appendix D: Brief Questionnaire for Demographic and Personal Characteristic Variables 
 
Section I: (please check one) 
 
Age 
 
o ______ 
 
o No Answer 
Class 
 
o Freshman 
o Sophomore 
o Junior 
o Senior 
o No Answer 
Gender 
 
o Male 
o Female 
o Other_________ 
o No Answer 
 
GPA 
o 2.0 – 2.5 
o 2.6 – 2.9 
o 3.0 – 3.5 
o 3.6 – 4.0 
o No Answer 
Dominant 
hand 
o Right 
o Left 
o No Answer 
Primary 
ethnicity/race 
o White 
o Hispanic or Latino 
o Black or African 
American 
o Asian/Pacific Islander 
o Other ________ 
o No Answer 
Major 
 
o Accounting 
o Finance 
o Marketing 
o Management 
o MIS 
o SCM 
o Other _________ 
Organizational 
Experience 
o Full-time employee 
o Part-time employee 
o Student Internship 
o Never worked 
 
Computer 
Skills 
o Personal use only 
o Microsoft Office 
skills 
o Programming 
o Hardware and 
software 
o Advanced knowledge 
Average hours 
of using 
computers per 
day 
o < 3 (Specify: ______) 
o 3 
o 4 
o 5 
o > 6 (Specify: ______) 
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Section II**: (please circle the numbers) 
 
1-Strongly Disagree                                    4-Neutral                                                  7-Strongly Agree 
IP1 I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to 
think. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
IP2 I don’t devote much thought and effort to preparing for 
the future. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
IP3 I often do whatever brings me pleasure here and now, 
even at the cost of some distant goal. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
IP4 I'm more concerned with what happens to me in the short 
run than in the long run. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
RS1 I like to test myself every now and then by doing 
something a little risky. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
RS2 Sometimes I will take a risk just for the fun of it. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
RS3 I sometimes find it exciting to do things for which I 
might get in trouble. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
RS4 Excitement and adventure are more important to me than 
security. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
Key: IP—Impulsivity and RS—Risk taking 
(** the order of the questions in this section II was randomly presented to subjects) 
 
Above survey questions were also adapted from Hu, West and Smarandescu (2015).   
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Section III: (please mark the boxes) 
For each of the ten paired lottery choices in the following table, please check the box next to 
your preferred option, either Option A or Option B.  Imagine throwing a ten-sided die.  Each 
outcome (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) is equally likely.  For instance, if you choose Option A in 
the Row No. 1 shown below, you will have a 1 in 10 chance of earning $2.00 and a 9 in 10 
chance of earning $1.60.  Similarly, Option B of Row No. 1 offers a 1 in 10 chance of earning 
$3.85 and a 9 in 10 chance of earning $0.10.  Please keep in mind that as you move down the 
table, the chances of the higher payoff for each Option A or B increases.   
 
Row 
Number Option A Option B 
1 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1 $1.60 if the die’s number is 2-10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 2-10 ☐ 
2 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-2 $1.60 if the die’s number is 3-10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-2 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 3-10 ☐ 
3 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-3 $1.60 if the die’s number is 4-10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-3 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 4-10 ☐ 
4 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-4 $1.60 if the die’s number is 5-10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-4 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 5-10 ☐ 
5 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-5 $1.60 if the die’s number is 6-10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-5 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 6-10 ☐ 
6 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-6 $1.60 if the die’s number is 7-10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-6 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 7-10 ☐ 
7 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-7 $1.60 if the die’s number is 8-10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-7 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 8-10 ☐ 
8 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-8 $1.60 if the die’s number is 9-10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-8 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 9-10 ☐ 
9 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-9 $1.60 if the die’s number is 10 ☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-9 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 10 ☐ 
10 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-10 ☐ $3.85 if the die’s number is 1-10 ☐ 
 
Above Risk Aversion measurement was adapted from Holt and Laury (2002).  
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Appendix E: Time Series Autoregressive Model (AR=1) Data-analysis Result 
91-DCR ar1.coef ar1.p-value ar1.se ar1.t-ratio const.coef const.p-value const.se const.t-ratio 
Exp1P-Exp1C -0.0940 0.6461 0.2046 -0.4592 0.0261 0.2097 0.0208 1.2544 
Exp1R-Exp1C 0.0934 0.6238 0.1904 0.4905 0.1014 0.0000 0.0227 4.4614 
Exp1RP-Exp1C -0.0390 0.8389 0.1920 -0.2033 0.1934 0.0000 0.0169 11.4298 
Exp2P-Exp1C 0.0224 0.9063 0.1898 0.1178 -0.0915 0.0000 0.0184 -4.9665 
Exp2R-Exp1C 0.1660 0.3822 0.1899 0.8739 -0.1502 0.0000 0.0258 -5.8109 
Exp2RP-Exp1C 0.2137 0.2468 0.1845 1.1581 0.0158 0.4653 0.0217 0.7301 
Exp3C-Exp1C 0.1019 0.5899 0.1890 0.5390 -0.0376 0.0153 0.0155 -2.4258 
Exp3P-Exp1C 0.2402 0.1802 0.1792 1.3401 -0.0874 0.0028 0.0293 -2.9839 
Exp3R-Exp1C 0.3486 0.0388 0.1687 2.0663 0.0353 0.2129 0.0284 1.2456 
Exp3RP-Exp1C 0.3347 0.0469 0.1685 1.9868 0.0220 0.3688 0.0245 0.8987 
Exp4P-Exp1C 0.0943 0.6117 0.1858 0.5077 -0.1229 0.0000 0.0242 -5.0728 
Exp4R-Exp1C 0.0751 0.6779 0.1808 0.4154 0.0632 0.0003 0.0176 3.5829 
Exp4RP-Exp1C 0.2441 0.1621 0.1746 1.3982 0.0574 0.0184 0.0244 2.3568 
Exp1R-Exp1P -0.3320 0.0606 0.1769 -1.8765 0.0745 0.0000 0.0096 7.7173 
Exp1RP-Exp1P -0.0937 0.6174 0.1876 -0.4995 0.1671 0.0000 0.0146 11.4299 
Exp2P-Exp1P -0.1017 0.6176 0.2037 -0.4993 -0.1185 0.0000 0.0178 -6.6590 
Exp2R-Exp1P 0.0771 0.7134 0.2099 0.3673 -0.1789 0.0000 0.0288 -6.2226 
Exp2RP-Exp1P 0.2153 0.3300 0.2210 0.9741 -0.0137 0.6350 0.0289 -0.4746 
Exp3C-Exp1P -0.2580 0.1763 0.1908 -1.3524 -0.0630 0.0000 0.0137 -4.5965 
Exp3P-Exp1P 0.2448 0.2557 0.2153 1.1366 -0.1174 0.0003 0.0327 -3.5918 
Exp3R-Exp1P 0.2373 0.2366 0.2005 1.1836 0.0052 0.8768 0.0336 0.1550 
Exp3RP-Exp1P 0.1975 0.3432 0.2084 0.9478 -0.0075 0.7766 0.0265 -0.2838 
Exp4P-Exp1P -0.1816 0.3887 0.2107 -0.8619 -0.1503 0.0000 0.0168 -8.9335 
Exp4R-Exp1P 0.0270 0.8945 0.2039 0.1326 0.0358 0.1314 0.0238 1.5085 
Exp4RP-Exp1P 0.1842 0.3630 0.2025 0.9097 0.0284 0.2677 0.0256 1.1083 
Exp1RP-Exp1R -0.0430 0.8115 0.1805 -0.2385 0.0930 0.0000 0.0125 7.4217 
Exp2P-Exp1R 0.1445 0.4410 0.1875 0.7705 -0.1922 0.0000 0.0214 -8.9951 
Exp2R-Exp1R 0.1381 0.4817 0.1962 0.7036 -0.2523 0.0000 0.0284 -8.8950 
Exp2RP-Exp1R 0.3026 0.1197 0.1944 1.5561 -0.0872 0.0031 0.0294 -2.9624 
Exp3C-Exp1R -0.0094 0.9596 0.1859 -0.0506 -0.1384 0.0000 0.0156 -8.8790 
Exp3P-Exp1R 0.2814 0.1552 0.1979 1.4215 -0.1905 0.0000 0.0298 -6.3989 
Exp3R-Exp1R 0.3379 0.0631 0.1818 1.8588 -0.0688 0.0434 0.0341 -2.0194 
Exp3RP-Exp1R 0.4233 0.0175 0.1781 2.3771 -0.0833 0.0043 0.0291 -2.8578 
Exp4P-Exp1R 0.0113 0.9542 0.1969 0.0575 -0.2244 0.0000 0.0181 -12.3837 
Exp4R-Exp1R 0.2469 0.1841 0.1859 1.3284 -0.0391 0.1213 0.0252 -1.5492 
Exp4RP-Exp1R 0.2913 0.1134 0.1840 1.5830 -0.0462 0.0656 0.0251 -1.8408 
Exp2P-Exp1RP 0.1397 0.4605 0.1893 0.7379 -0.2848 0.0000 0.0210 -13.5599 
Exp2R-Exp1RP 0.1305 0.5015 0.1941 0.6722 -0.3450 0.0000 0.0305 -11.3192 
Exp2RP-Exp1RP 0.5656 0.0012 0.1740 3.2495 -0.1802 0.0000 0.0379 -4.7615 
Exp3C-Exp1RP -0.2805 0.1080 0.1745 -1.6070 -0.2306 0.0000 0.0114 -20.2704 
Exp3P-Exp1RP 0.3527 0.0609 0.1882 1.8740 -0.2831 0.0000 0.0341 -8.3019 
Exp3R-Exp1RP 0.4387 0.0106 0.1717 2.5554 -0.1618 0.0000 0.0378 -4.2748 
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Exp3RP-Exp1RP 0.3923 0.0268 0.1771 2.2148 -0.1745 0.0000 0.0283 -6.1705 
Exp4P-Exp1RP 0.1197 0.5327 0.1919 0.6239 -0.3169 0.0000 0.0231 -13.7227 
Exp4R-Exp1RP 0.0405 0.8325 0.1917 0.2115 -0.1307 0.0000 0.0192 -6.8161 
Exp4RP-Exp1RP 0.3648 0.0380 0.1759 2.0744 -0.1393 0.0000 0.0252 -5.5341 
Exp2R-Exp2P 0.0995 0.5945 0.1869 0.5323 -0.0601 0.0004 0.0170 -3.5461 
Exp2RP-Exp2P 0.0219 0.9085 0.1906 0.1150 0.1064 0.0000 0.0155 6.8798 
Exp3C-Exp2P 0.0632 0.7593 0.2064 0.3064 0.0535 0.0005 0.0154 3.4774 
Exp3P-Exp2P 0.1735 0.3598 0.1895 0.9158 0.0024 0.9044 0.0200 0.1202 
Exp3R-Exp2P 0.2483 0.1820 0.1860 1.3347 0.1242 0.0000 0.0197 6.3006 
Exp3RP-Exp2P 0.1086 0.5717 0.1920 0.5655 0.1123 0.0000 0.0152 7.3895 
Exp4P-Exp2P -0.0843 0.6400 0.1803 -0.4677 -0.0320 0.0035 0.0110 -2.9166 
Exp4R-Exp2P -0.3260 0.0625 0.1750 -1.8628 0.1560 0.0000 0.0107 14.5218 
Exp4RP-Exp2P 0.0365 0.8578 0.2035 0.1792 0.1491 0.0000 0.0161 9.2911 
Exp2RP-Exp2R -0.3481 0.0405 0.1699 -2.0490 0.1678 0.0000 0.0130 12.8766 
Exp3C-Exp2R 0.3907 0.0495 0.1989 1.9642 0.1099 0.0003 0.0307 3.5788 
Exp3P-Exp2R -0.0117 0.9500 0.1869 -0.0626 0.0638 0.0000 0.0147 4.3342 
Exp3R-Exp2R -0.0565 0.7657 0.1896 -0.2980 0.1871 0.0000 0.0170 10.9957 
Exp3RP-Exp2R -0.0624 0.7464 0.1928 -0.3234 0.1738 0.0000 0.0168 10.3283 
Exp4P-Exp2R -0.0371 0.8394 0.1832 -0.2026 0.0282 0.0596 0.0150 1.8837 
Exp4R-Exp2R -0.1273 0.4925 0.1855 -0.6864 0.2154 0.0000 0.0179 12.0212 
Exp4RP-Exp2R -0.1114 0.5783 0.2004 -0.5558 0.2106 0.0000 0.0197 10.6663 
Exp3C-Exp2RP 0.2993 0.1337 0.1995 1.4997 -0.0536 0.0343 0.0253 -2.1168 
Exp3P-Exp2RP -0.1820 0.3025 0.1766 -1.0310 -0.1028 0.0000 0.0153 -6.7187 
Exp3R-Exp2RP 0.1248 0.4924 0.1819 0.6864 0.0196 0.2198 0.0160 1.2272 
Exp3RP-Exp2RP 0.0976 0.5989 0.1855 0.5259 0.0064 0.7024 0.0167 0.3821 
Exp4P-Exp2RP -0.1573 0.3871 0.1819 -0.8649 -0.1391 0.0000 0.0148 -9.3904 
Exp4R-Exp2RP 0.1071 0.5594 0.1835 0.5837 0.0480 0.0063 0.0176 2.7311 
Exp4RP-Exp2RP 0.2277 0.2550 0.2000 1.1382 0.0415 0.0372 0.0199 2.0841 
Exp3P-Exp3C 0.3831 0.0408 0.1873 2.0459 -0.0497 0.1206 0.0320 -1.5523 
Exp3R-Exp3C 0.4513 0.0080 0.1702 2.6510 0.0723 0.0307 0.0334 2.1612 
Exp3RP-Exp3C 0.4556 0.0089 0.1742 2.6156 0.0591 0.0107 0.0232 2.5507 
Exp4P-Exp3C 0.1687 0.4068 0.2034 0.8295 -0.0846 0.0000 0.0197 -4.2925 
Exp4R-Exp3C -0.0780 0.6808 0.1896 -0.4114 0.1006 0.0000 0.0162 6.1939 
Exp4RP-Exp3C 0.2060 0.2509 0.1794 1.1482 0.0949 0.0000 0.0187 5.0871 
Exp3R-Exp3P -0.1559 0.3878 0.1805 -0.8636 0.1232 0.0000 0.0127 9.6684 
Exp3RP-Exp3P -0.1538 0.4024 0.1837 -0.8373 0.1098 0.0000 0.0140 7.8167 
Exp4P-Exp3P 0.0416 0.8294 0.1928 0.2155 -0.0353 0.0118 0.0140 -2.5166 
Exp4R-Exp3P -0.1309 0.4727 0.1822 -0.7181 0.1511 0.0000 0.0169 8.9620 
Exp4RP-Exp3P -0.1726 0.3754 0.1947 -0.8865 0.1465 0.0000 0.0157 9.3457 
Exp3RP-Exp3R 0.1468 0.4104 0.1783 0.8233 -0.0133 0.4516 0.0177 -0.7527 
Exp4P-Exp3R 0.0651 0.7287 0.1876 0.3468 -0.1580 0.0000 0.0179 -8.8461 
Exp4R-Exp3R 0.1863 0.2945 0.1777 1.0482 0.0286 0.1144 0.0181 1.5786 
Exp4RP-Exp3R 0.1736 0.3486 0.1852 0.9374 0.0225 0.2492 0.0195 1.1522 
Exp4P-Exp3RP -0.0864 0.6500 0.1904 -0.4537 -0.1457 0.0000 0.0134 -10.9140 
Exp4R-Exp3RP 0.0069 0.9697 0.1804 0.0380 0.0415 0.0017 0.0132 3.1321 
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Exp4RP-Exp3RP -0.1822 0.3221 0.1840 -0.9901 0.0367 0.0005 0.0105 3.4925 
Exp4R-Exp4P -0.3100 0.0742 0.1737 -1.7853 0.1879 0.0000 0.0135 13.8946 
Exp4RP-Exp4P -0.1850 0.3541 0.1997 -0.9266 0.1829 0.0000 0.0140 13.0703 
Exp4RP-Exp4R -0.0566 0.7617 0.1866 -0.3033 -0.0050 0.7335 0.0146 -0.3405 
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